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NOTE
PUSHING STATE REGULATORY COMMISSIONS
BEHIND THE BRIGHT LINE: FERC JURISDICTION
PREVAILS IN MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT CO. V
MISSISSIPPI EX REL. MOORE, 487 U.S. -, 108
S. CT. 2428 (1988).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Once the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) orders a
utility to buy electricity from a nuclear power plant, can a state review
the prudence of that utility's decision to help build the plant in the first
place? The United States Supreme Court said "no" in Mississippi Power
& Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore.' Briefly, FERC ordered a
Mississippi utility to buy a certain amount of nuclear power that cost
much more than had been expected. Consequently, the state public utility
commission allowed the company to pass on the cost to its retail consumers. The pass-through was challenged, and the Mississippi Supreme
Court ruled that the state commission should review whether the utility
and its parent company acted reasonably when they decided to complete
the nuclear power plant despite rapidly rising costs.' The U.S. Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the Mississippi commission could not "invade the province of federal authority" exercised by FERC . This Note
will discuss the nationwide trend of state commissions reviewing prudence
decisions of utilities and the Court's response-to strengthen FERC's
jurisdiction.
Mississippi Power & Light Co. (MP&L) is wholly owned by Middle
South Utilities (MSU), a public utility holding company.4 MSU also owns
three other operating companies. All four sell electricity wholesale to
each other. Each also sells electricity retail in separate service areas in
Louisiana, Arkansas, Missouri, and Mississippi. 6 The four companies
operate as an integrated power pool, and "System Agreements" filed with
1.487 U.S. -. , 108 S. Ct. 2428 (1988).
2. State ex rel. Pittman v. Mississippi Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 506 So. 2d 978, 987 (Miss. 1987),
rev'd sub noma.MississippiPower & Light, 108 S. Ct. 2428.
3. Mississippi Power & Light, 108 S. Ct. at 2442.
4. Id. at 2431.
5. Id.at 2431 n.1.
6. Id.at 2431.
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FERC govern wholesale transactions among them. The Federal Power
Act authorizes FERC to regulate wholesale sales.'
By contrast, state utility commissions regulate the retail sales of each
operating company.9 The Mississippi Public Service Commission (MPSC)
regulates MP&L's retail rate.'" In 1974, MPSC granted a certificate to
build two nuclear power plants to MP&L and a new MSU subsidiary,
Middle South Energy, Inc. (MSE). " MSE was created to finance, own,
and operate the Grand Gulf nuclear plants, and MSE "hired MP&L to
design, construct, and operate the facilities."' 2 Thus, the two wholly
owned MSU subsidiaries applied to MPSC for a certificate of public
convenience and necessity authorizing the construction of the plants.", In
granting the certificate, MPSC noted that MP&L was part of "an integrated electric system" and that "the Grand Gulf Project [would] serve
as a major source of baseload capacity for the company and the entire
Middle South System pooling arrangement."14
By the late 1970s, however, the projected need for the plants had
fizzled, making Grand Gulf's power-generating capacity unnecessary.' 5
As costs mounted from regulatory delays, construction requirements, and
high inflation, management decided to stop building Grand Gulf 2 and
concentrate on finishing Grand Gulf 1. 6 Unfortunately, the completion
of Grand Gulf I cost about $3 billion, or about six times its projected
cost.' 7 The wholesale cost of Grand Gulf's power, therefore, greatly
exceeded the cost of power produced by other MSU facilities."
After extensive hearings to review MSU's wholesale rates, FERC or7. Id.
8. Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (1982) ("All rates and charges made, demanded, or
received by any public utility for .. . the transmission or sale of electric energy subject to the
jurisdiction of the Commission ... shall be just and reasonable, and any such rate or charge that
is not just and reasonable is hereby declared to be unlawful.").
9. Mississippi Power & Light, 108 S. Ct. at 2431.
10. Id.
11.Id. at 2432.
12. Id.
13. Id. A state's public utility commission must approve a certificate of public convenience and
necessity before a utility can build a new power plant. The commission usually holds hearings to
ensure that the plant is needed and will not burden electricity consumers with unnecessary construction
costs. See, e.g., id.at 2432 n.4.
14. id. at 2432 (citing Appendix to Motion to Dismiss at 27-28, 30-31).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 2432 & n.5 (citing Mississippi Indus. v. Federal Energy Reg. Comm'n, 808 F.2d 1525,
1531 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied. 108 S. Ct. 500, modified, 814 F2d 733, aff'd, 822 F.2d 1103,
modified, 822 F2d 1104 (1987).

18. Id. at 2432-33.

Spring 19891

PUSHING STATE REGULATORY COMMISSIONS

dered that 33 percent of Grand Gulf's capacity costs 9 should be allocated
to MP&L to "achieve just and reasonable results. 2 FERC reasoned that
the four operating companies should share the cost of the system's investment in Grand Gulf I in proportion to their relative demand for energy

generated by the system as a whole. 2' The United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia affirmed FERC's decision. 22 The appeals

court also rejected challenges to FERC's authority.23 The court held that
the Federal Power Act gave FERC the authority to set the allocation of
Grand Gulf's capacity and costs and affirmed the order as both rational
and within FERC's discretion to remedy discriminatory rates.24
Before FERC proceedings were over, however, MP&L filed an application with the MPSC for a substantial increase in its retail rates. 2 The
Mississippi commission eventually approved a rate increase to allow
MP&L to cover its FERC-ordered obligation, about $27 million each
month. 26 Also, in its order the MPSC said it intended to continue to
challenge "the validity and fairness of the FERC allocation to MP&L. "27
The Attorney General of Mississippi and consumer groups appealed to
the Mississippi Supreme Court, charging that the MPSC had exceeded
its authority by adopting "retail rates to pay Grand Gulf expenses without
first determining that the expenses were prudently incurred."28 The court
agreed. The Mississippi court also concluded that MSU and its subsidiaries "used the jurisdictional relationship between state and federal reg19. The "capacity costs" included the cost of building and operating the nuclear power plant.
State ex rel. Pittman v. Mississippi Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 506 So. 2d 978, 987 (Miss. 1987), rev'd
sub nom. Mississippi Power & Light, 108 S.Ct. 2428. The FERC-approved rates for the electricity,
coupled with the amount to be sold (the allocation), implicitly allowed MSE to recoup 100 percent
of its costs in building Grand Gulf I since no costs were judged imprudent. See Mississippi Power
& Light, 108 S. Ct. at 2434, 2441. Any decrease in the rates or the allocation probably would have
meant that shareholders of MSU and its subsidiaries would pay for Grand Gulf I, not its retail
customers. See id. at 2446 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan implies in his dissent that if
a cost is determined to be imprudent, the company's shareholders will pay, not its retail customers.
See id.
20. Mississippi Power & Light, 108 S. Ct. at 2434 (quoting Middle South Energy, Inc., 31
F.E.R.C. 1 61,305,61,655, aff'dsub nom. Mississippi Indus., 808 F.2d 1525). FERC had governed
MSU wholesale rates and wholesale transactions among its subsidiaries through "System Agreements" in 1951, 1973, and 1982. Id.at 2431. The supplemental agreement FERC reviewed, the
Unit Power Sales Agreement (UPSA), provided wholesale rates for MSE's sale of Grand Gulf I
capacity and energy. Id. at 2433. The proposed UPSA obligated MP&L to purchase 31.63 percent
of Grand Gulf's capacity. Id.
21. Id.
23. Mississippi Indus., 808 F.2d 1525.
23. Id.at 1539.
24. Id.at 1566.
25. Mississippi Power & Light, 108 S. Ct. at 2435.
26. Id. at 2436.
27. 1d.
28. State ex rel. Pittman v. Mississippi Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 506 So. 2d 978, 979 (Miss. 1987),
rev'd sub nom. MississippiPower & Light, 108 S.Ct. 2428.
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ulatory agencies to completely evade a prudency review of Grand Gulf
2' The court remanded the case
costs" by either state or federal agencies.
3
review.
further
for
to the MPSC
In justifying the remand, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that

Mississippi could conduct a prudence review before passing on the cost
to consumers despite FERC's order that MP&L should pay 33 percent
of the Grand Gulf costs." In other words, FERC's action did not preempt a Mississippi prudence review. The state court said the test to
determine whether FERC had pre-empted a particular aspect of state
regulation required the court to "examine whose [sic] matters actually
determined, whether expressly or impliedly, by the FERC." 32 The Mississippi court said that FERC was never confronted with the question of
whether the completion or operation of Grand Gulf was prudent)' The
Mississippi Supreme Court remanded the case to the MPSC "for a review
of the prudency of the Grand Gulf investment."' It said the review "must
determine whether MP&L, [MSE] and MSU acted reasonably when they
constructed Grand Gulf 1, in light of the change in demand for electric
power in this state and the sudden escalation of costs." 3"
The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the Mississippi court's analysis of
the pre-emption issue. 36 It held that the state was pre-empted from reviewing the prudence of MSU management decisions under the Federal
Power Act and the United States Constitution's Supremacy Clause.37 The
Court said FERC had exclusive authority to determine the reasonableness
of wholesale rates and power allocations and that states may not bar
29. Id. The court noted that neither FERC nor the MSPC had reviewed MP&L's decision to
continue to build Grand Gulf I and put it on line. Id. at 986. FERC at first said it did not have
jurisdiction over MP&L's purchase decision, and Mississippi officials did not press the issue. Mississippi Power & Light, 108 S. Ct. at 2448 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Then MP&L argued that only
FERC could review that decison, and by this time, FERC agreed. Id.
30. Pittman, 506 So. 2d at 987.
31. Id. at 984.
32. Id. at 986 (quoting Appeal of Sinclair Mach. Prods., Inc., 126 N.H. 822, 833, 498 A.2d
696, 704 (1985)).
33. Id. at 986-87. The United States Supreme Court later contended that while FERC did not
expressly discuss the "prudence" of constructing Grand Gulf, it "implicitly accepted the uncontroverted testimony of the MSU executives who explained why they believed the decisions to construct
and to complete Grand Gulf I were sound." MississippiPower & Light, 108 S. Ct. at 2434. The
Supreme Court also argued that Mississippi challengers "failed to raise the matter of the prudence
of the investment in Grand Gulf before FERC though it was a matter FERC easily could have
considered." Id. at 2441. Dissenting Justice Brennan pointed out that FERC refused to consider this
prudence issue. Id. at 2448. He added that FERC has since changed its policy to declare that its
determination regarding the prudence of a wholesaler's costs inevitably determines the prudence of
a retail utility's wholesale purchase and its decision to enter the agreement. Id. The majority failed
to mention the FERC policy shift.
34. Pittman, 506 So. 2d at 987.
35. Id.
36. Mississippi Power & Light, 108 S. Ct. at 2440.
37. Id.
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passing through those wholesale rates to retail consumers." Further, the
Court held that the pre-emptive effect of FERC's jurisdiction did not turn
on whether a particular matter was actually determined in FERC proceedings since FERC had jurisdiction over wholesale rates and agreements
affecting them 9 The Court concluded, "Mississippi's effort to invade
the province of federal auithority must be rejected."'
LEGAL BACKGROUND
The federal authority to regulate wholesale transactions of electricity
was created in the Public Utility Act of 1935."'The Act responded directly
to a 1927 U.S. Supreme Court decision that struck down a state's attempt
to regulate interstate wholesale rates as a direct burden on interstate
commerce.4" The Act created the Federal Power Commission (FPC), now
FERC, and vested it with exclusive authority to regulate the rates governing interstate sales of electricity for resale.43 Language in the act and
subsequent cases make clear that Congress' intent was to "fill the gap"
in regulation of electric power sales created by Attleboro and to displace
prior state regulation with comprehensive federal regulation of wholesale
electric rates.45
One expression of this comprehensive scheme is the "filed rate doctrine," first enunciated in 1951 in Montana-DakotaUtilitiesCo. v. Northwestern Public Service Co.' In the case, a company sued in federal court
to recover damages for alleged unreasonable electric utility rates." The
rates, approved by the FPC, stood. The U.S. Supreme Court said, "We
hold that the right to a reasonable rate is the right to the rate which the
Commission files or fixes, and that, except for review of the Commission's
orders, the courts can assume no right to a different one on the ground
that, in its opinion, it is the only or the more reasonable one." 4
38. Id. at 2439.
39. Id. at 2440.
40. Id. at 2442.
41. Ch. 687, § 213, 49 Stat. 803, 847-63 (1935) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824 (1982))
(adding to the Federal Power Act of 1920, as amended).
42. Public Utils. Comm'n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927).
43. New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 340 (1982).
44. Federal Power Act, 16 U.S. § 824(a) (1982) ("It is declared that the business of transmitting
and selling electric energy for ultimate distribution to the public is affected with a public interest,
and that Federal regulation of matters relating to generation . . . of that part of such business which
consists of the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and the sale of such energy at
wholesale in interstate commerce is necessary in the public interest, such Federal regulation, however,
to extend only to those matters which are not subject to regulation by the States.").
45. E.g., Federal Power Comm'n v. Southern Cal. Edision Co., 376 U.S. 205, 210 (1964).
46. 341 U.S. 246 (1951).
47. Id. at 248-49.
48, Id. at 252-53.
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The FPC's jurisdictional preeminence was further protected by the
"bright line" established in FederalPower Commission v. Southern California Edison Co."9 The Court held in 1964 that the Act gave the FPC
jurisdiction over all sales of electric energy at wholesale in interstate
commerce."' The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had ruled that FPC
jurisdiction was restricted to wholesale sales that were constitutionally
beyond the State's power to regulate. 5 ' The appeals court relied on the
plain language of a clause in the Federal Power Act: "[S]uch Federal
regulation, however, [is] to extend only to those matters which are not
subject to regulation by the States." 5 2
The Supreme Court rejected the lower court's plain language argument
and its corollary that FPC jurisdiction should be examined in each case
in light of the Congressional intent of the Federal Power Act.53 The
Supreme Court said, "Congress meant to draw a bright line easily ascertained, between state and federal jurisdiction, making unnecessary
such case-by-case analysis. This was done in the Power Act by making
FPC jurisdiction plenary and extending it to all wholesale sales in interstate commerce except those which Congress has made explicitly subject
to regulation by the States. "' Wholesale rates were the business of FERC,
while retail rates remained the province of the states.
State Power Boosted
Almost 20 years later, however, the bright line marking the wholesale/
retail division of jurisdiction was blurred in Arkansas Electric Cooperative
Corp. v. Arkansas Public Service Commission." The Arkansas Public
Service Commission (PSC) asserted jurisdiction over the wholesale rates
charged by the Arkansas Electric Cooperative Corp. (AECC) to its member retail distributors, all of whom were in the state. The Supreme Court
upheld the PSC's jurisdiction despite the fact that it intended to regulate
wholesale rates. 6
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, said that if AECC were not
a rural cooperative, its wholesale rates would be subject exclusively to
federal regulation since AECC was tied to a multistate electricity "grid,"

49. 376 U.S. at 215.
50. Id.at 210.
51. Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 310 F.2d 784, 789 (9th Cir. 1962),
rev'd, 376 U.S. 205 (1964).
52. 310 F.2d at 785 (citing Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (1982)).
53. Southern Cal. Edison, 376 U.S. at 215.
54. Id.at215-16.
55. 461 U.S. 375 (1983).
56. Id. at 377.
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which meant AECC engaged in interstate commerce." However, since
the co-op was under the jurisdiction of the Rural Electrification Administration (REA), the FPC had no jurisdiction over AECC's wholesale
rates."' The Court said Congress did not intend to leave the area unregulated, either, which also could have pre-empted any state regulation. 59
The REA itself allows state regulation of both retail and wholesale rates."
More importantly, the Court blurred the bright line separating jurisdiction between wholesale and retail rates by allowing the Arkansas PSC
to set wholesale rates. The Court said if Attleboro were applied, it would
require setting aside the PSC's asserted jurisdiction over wholesale rates, 6
but it refused to apply the "bright line" test:
(lit is difficult to square the mechanical line drawn in Anleboro and
its predecessor cases, and based on a supposedly precise division
between "direct" and "indirect" effects on interstate commerce, with
the general trend in our modem Commerce Clause jurisprudence to
look in every case to "the nature of the state regulation involved,
the objective of the state, and the effect of the regulation upon the
national interest in the commerce." 62
Since no federal regulation applied, the Court was free to find that
"modem" Commerce Clause analysis allowed state regulation. 63 The
Court noted that it had not had an opportunity in about 50 years to reject
this "anachronistic" division of jurisdiction based on the retail/wholesale
split; it seized the opportunity in Arkansas ElectricCooperative.6 "Attleboro can no longer be thought to provide the sole standard by which to
decide this case, and we proceed instead to undertake an analysis grounded
more solidly in our modem cases. '"65 Using the modem standard, the
57. Id. at 381.
58. Id. at 382.
59. Id. at 384-85.
60. Id. at 387.
61. id. at 389.
62. Id. at 390 (quoting Illinois Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Co., 314 U.S. 498, 505 (1942)). The
would-be regulators in Illinois Gas, however, failed to gain anything from the Commerce Clause
interpretation since the FPC clearly had jurisdiction over the transaction at issue-the wholesale sale
of natural gas by an Illinois pipeline corporation to local distributors in Illinois. 314 U.S. at 506.
63. Arkansas Elec. Coop., 461 U.S. at 391, The Court said the most serious concern of the
modern Commerce Clause test--economic protectionism--was not implicated in the case. Id. at
394. It also said that regulation of AECC's wholesale rates was "well within the scope of 'legitimate
public interests'" that a State could regulate. Id.
64. Id. at 391. The Court had not previously had the opportunity because no case presented a
choice between state regulation and unexercisedfederal power since FERC governs most wholesale
utilities. Only the fact that it was a rural co-op allowed some federal agency other than FERC, in
this instance the Rural Electrification Administration (REA), to have general jurisdiction over the
utility. Further, the REA regulatory scheme allows state regulation of wholesale and retail rates. Id.
at 387-88.
65. Id. at 393.
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Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. test,0 the Court found "the PSC's assertion
of jurisdiction over the wholesale rates charged by AECC to its members
offends neither the Supremacy Clause nor the Commerce Clause."'
The next expansion of state authority came when a court transferred
the rationale from Arkansas Electric Cooperative to a traditional utility,
one regulated by FERC. A Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court in Pike
County Light & Power v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission used
Arkansas Electric Cooperative to affirm the action of its state utility
commission, which had rejected a retail utility's claim for a purchased
power expense." The court, ruling just four months after the 1983 Arkansas case, said, "The FERC focuses on . . . whether it is just and
reasonable for that company to charge a particular rate, but makes no
determination of whether it is just and reasonable for Pike to incur such
a rate as an expense." By contrast, the court said, the state public utility
commission's jurisdiction focuses on whether "it is reasonable for Pike
to incur such costs in light of available alternatives." 7' In other words,
the Pennsylvania court, like the Supreme Court in Arkansas Electric
Cooperative, had found a "silence" in federal regulation. In Pike County
Power & Light, the silence went to FERC's non-jurisdiction over the
reasonableness of incurring a cost. The state court found that the state
could regulate that "silence" without offending the Commerce Clause.
"Recent holdings of Supreme Court have indicated . . . that for state
regulatory action to violate the commerce clause it must impose a direct
burden on interstate commerce." 7 The court found no burden since the
public utility commission's decision did not hold it unreasonable for Pike
to buy power in the interstate arena, from just one particular company.72
Thus, the Pennsylvania court held that a regulatory commission could
examine the reasonableness of incurring costs.73
66. The test states:
Where [a] statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest,
and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes of one
degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on
the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well
with a lesser impact on interstate activities.
Id. at 393-94 (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
67. Id. at 396. Dissenters Justice White and Chief Justice Burger argued that Congress has occupied
the field of wholesale power rate regulation. Id.
68. 77 Pa. Commw. 268, 465 A.2d 735, 738 (1983).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id., 465 A.2d at 738 n.6 (citing Arkansas Elec. Coop., 461 U.S. 375).
72. id., 738.
73. Id. One commentator argues that the Pike County "exception" does not create parallel state
review of allocation agreements found by FERC to be just and reasonable, the issue in Mississippi
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FERC itself endorsed the distinction described in Pike County Power
& Light between the reasonableness of rates and the reasonableness of
incurring those rates, according to the 1985 case Appeal of SinclairMachine
Products, Inc.74 The New Hampshire Supreme Court quoted FERC as
stating that its "decision to accept the agreement for filing is premised
on the fact that the formula rate for this jurisdictional sale will not produce
excessive revenues [and] is not . . . based on a determination that the
...purchase is prudent." 5 The New Hampshire court stated the evolving
standard for review this way:
The approach of this modem trend ... is to examine those matters
actually determined, whether expressly or implicitly, by the FERC.
As to those matters not resolved by the FERC, State regulation is
not preempted provided that State regulation would not contradict
or undermine FERC determinations and federal interests, or impose
inconsistent obligations on the utility companies involved. 76
The court then remanded the case to New Hampshire's Public Utilities
Commission to determine whether the electric company was reasonable
when it purchased power under FERC-approved rates in light of other
purchase options available to the utility.77
Court Pulls the Plug on State Power
The Supreme Court in 1986 reined in the expansion of state oversight
and mandated automatic pass-through of FERC-approved rates in Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg.7" FERC had allocated low-cost
hydroelectric power between two utility companies, but the North Carolina Utilities Commission later changed the allocation, giving Nantahala
more of the low-cost power than FERC had. The Supreme Court held
that FERC's allocation, which was set in a wholesale rate proceeding,
Power & Light. Duffy, Will the Supreme Court Lose Patience with Prudence? 9 ENERGY L.J. 83,
896 (1988).
74. 126 N.H. 822, 498 A.2d 696 (1985).
75. Id. at833, 498 A.2d at704 (citing Application of Commonwealth Elec. Co., Mass. Dept.
of Pub. Utils,
Docket No.84-3B-2 (May 10, 1984) (quoting Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 23
F.E.R.C. 61,006, 61,009 (1983))).
76. Id.
77. Id., 498 A.2d at705; see also Public Serv. Co. of Colo. v.Public Utils. Comm'n of Colo.,
644 P.2d 933 (Colo. 1982) (which affirmed In re Western Slope Gas Co., 31 Pub. Util.
Rep. 4th
(PUR) 93 (Colo. P.U.C. 1979) (although FERC-imposed cost was reasonable operating expense,
the state
utilities
commission could refuse toautomatically pass the cost increase on to natural gas
consumers).
78. 476 U.S. 953 (1986); see also Ercolano, NarragansettUpdate:From Washington Gas Light
to Nantahala.7 ENERGY L.J. 333 (1986). InNamahalaPower & Light, "the Court drove home the
message that
local
utility
commissions have a duty not to interfere,
in any manner, inthe area of
the FERC's exclusive domain-regulation of interstate
wholesale rates."
Id. at341.
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pre-empted the state commission's allocation of low-cost power. 9 The
North Carolina Supreme Court, in affirming the commission action earlier,
had found that its utility commission's decision fit within an exception
to the "filed rate" doctrine since it did not order Nantahala to disobey
any FERC order.' The United States Supreme Court rejected the argument:
No such explicit exception by Congress has been alleged here....
Once FERC sets such a rate, a State may not conclude in setting
retail rates that the FERC-approved wholesale rates are unreasonable.
A State must rather give effect to Congress' desire to give FERC
plenary authority over interstate wholesale rates, and to ensure that
the States do not interfere with this authority."
Further, the Court said FERC's filed rate doctrine is not limited to
rates. "Here FERC's decision directly affects Nantahala's wholesale rates
by determining the amount of low-cost power that it may obtain, and
FERC required Nantahala's wholesale rate to be filed in accordance with
that allocation. FERC's allocation of entitlement power is therefore presumptively entitled to more than the negligible weight given it by [the
Utilities Commission of North Carolina]." 82 The Court said North Carolina should not have used cases like Pike County Power & Light that
challenged a utility's source of power, noting they did not challenge the
FERC-approved rates involved. "Accordingly, the North Carolina Supreme Court erred in relying on cases treating the reasonableness of
purchasing from a particular source of, rather than paying a particular
rate for, FERC-approved power." 3
The Court seemed to leave the door slightly ajar, however, with this
dicta:
Without deciding this issue, we may assume that a particular quantity
of power procured by a utility from a particular source could be
deemed unreasonably excessive if lower-cost power is available elsewhere, even though the higher-cost power actually purchased is obtained at a FERC-approved, and therefore reasonable, price. 4
79. Nantahala Power & Light, 476 U.S. at 955.
80. State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Nantahala Power & Light Co., 313 N.C. 614,688, 332 S.E.2d
397, 440-41 (1985), rev'd sub nor. Nantahala Power & Light, 476 U.S. 953.
81. Nantahala Power & Light. 476 U.S. at 966. The state court said the commission was not
questioning the reasonableness of the rates themselves, but of Nantahala passing all those costs on
to its retail customers. State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n, 332 S.E.2d at 405-06.
82. Nantahata Power & Light, 476 U.S. at 967.
83. Id. at 972 (citing Pike County Light & Power Co. v. Pennsylvania Public Util. Comm'n, 77
Pa. Commw. 268, 273-74, 465 A.2d 735, 737-38 (1983); Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co. v. State
Corp. Comm'n. 4 Kan. App. 2d 674, 679-80, 610 P.2d 121, 127 (1980)).
84. Id. At least one commentator believed the dicta created a question: "However, the Court
leaves unanswered the extent to which a state commission may examine whether a less expensive
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ANALYSIS
The Mississippi Supreme Court relied heavily on the Nantahala dicta
in its decision to order the state's public service commission to investigate
the prudence of buying into the nuclear power plant."' The United States
Supreme Court also relied on Nantahala-but it reached the opposite
result. "We hold that our decision in Nantahala rests on a foundation
that is broad enough to support the order entered by FERC in this case
and to require the MPSC to treat MP&L's FERC-mandated payments for
Grand Gulf costs as reasonably incurred operating expenses for the purpose of setting MP&L's retail rates." 6 Apparently, the Court wanted to
stop the state trend of challenging FERC's jurisdiction even where that
jurisdiction had not been fully exercised.
The Mississippi court said Nantahaladoes not "forc[ej the [Mississippi
Public Service Commission] to set rates based on the construction and
operation of a plant (nuclear or otherwise) that generates power that is
not needed at a price that is not prudent." 7 The U.S. Supreme Court
disagreed but did not reply directly. It said, "The reasoning that led to
our decision in Nantahala applies with equal force here and compels the
same conclusion-States may not alter FERC-ordered allocations of power
by substituting their own determination of what would be just and fair. "88
The Court explained its "reasoning," and presumably the policy driving
the decision, as "fundamental principles concerning the pre-emptive impact of federal jurisdiction over wholesale rates on state regulation."89
Using Nantahala, the Court linked power rates and power allocations
to the plenary power of FERC. 9° It explained the Mississippi dicta this
way:
As we assumed, it might well be unreasonable for a utility to purchase
unnecessary quantities of high cost power, even at FERC-approved
rates, if it had the legal right to refuse to buy that power. But if the
integrity of FERC regulationis to be preserved, it obviously cannot

source of wholesale power is available to a utility for resale to its retail customers." Comment,
Electric Energy Rate Regulation: Another Line Drawn in the Federal-State Jurisdictional Struggle
[Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg], 26 WASHBtURN L.J. 632, 644 (1987).
85. State ex rel. Pittman v. Mississippi Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 506 So. 2d 978, 985 (Miss. 1987),
rev'd sub nom. Mississippi Power& Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 108 S. Ct. 2428 (1988).
The state court quotes the Nantahala dicta just after distinguishing the case factually, noting that
"no question was raised about the prudency or necessity of acquiring low-cost hydroelectric power."
Pittman, 506 So. 2d at 985.
86. Mississippi Power & Light. 108 S. Ct. at 2438,
87. Pittman, 506 So. 2d at 985,
88. Mississippi Power & Light, 108 S. Ct. at 2438,
89. Id. at 2439.
90. Id. at 2440.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 29

be unreasonable for MP&L to procure the particular quantity of highpriced Grand Gulf power that FERC has ordered it to pay for. 9'
The only "obvious" fact is that the Court equated a FERC decision
with a reasonable decision on all the utility issues. The Court did not
directly defend FERC's decision, only its jurisdiction to make it. Further
protecting FERC's jurisdiction, the Court said the place to attack FERC's
"unreasonableness" decision was in front of the Commission or in front
of a court reviewing the FERC order-not in state court.9 2
Preferring jurisdictional form over precedential substance, the Court
assumed that FERC "decided" the prudence issue whether it considered
it or not. The Court apparently discarded FERC's own theory, espoused
in Appeal of Sinclair, that it could decide the reasonableness of a rate
independent of deciding the reasonableness of incurring the rate. 9' In fact,
the New Hampshire court in Sinclair noted that FERC preferred not to
consider a potential purchaser's decision to acquire the power." The
Supreme Court failed to defend or even discuss FERC's policy preference
when it mentioned Sinclair in its pre-emption discussion.9 5 Instead, it
moved to its holding that the pre-emptive effective of FERC regulations
was dispositive. 9 In sum, the Court focused on FERC's power; it missed
the point of the line of cases that acknowledged FERC's former reluctance
to wield its mighty power in the area that, in effect, decided all retail
rates.
In his dissent, Justice Brennan (who wrote the majority opinion in
Arkansas Electric Cooperative) clearly distinguished the two types of
prudence standards by which to judge MP&L's action-the reasonableness of the amount of power that MP&L bought because FERC ordered
it to buy that much, and the reasonableness of MP&L's decisions to help
build Grand Gulf at all. 97 On the first issue, Brennan said FERC's jurisdiction gave it authority to determine the amount of wholesale power and
the rate, which meant MP&L's "decision" to buy that much power was
reasonable (since it had no choice). 98 Then he said the second prudence
issue was "whether, to the extent [MP&L's] decision to participate in
91. Id. (emphasis added).
92. Id.
93. 126 N.H. 822, 833, 498 A.2d 696, 704 (1985) (citing Application of Commonwealth Elec.
Co., Mass. Dept. of Pub. Utils, Docket No. 84-3B-2 (May 10, 1984) (quoting Pennsylvania Power

& Light Co., 23 FE.R.C.

61,006, 61,009 (1983))).

94. Id.
95. Mississippi Power & Light, 108 S. Ct. at 2437. In fact, the Court said later in the opinion
that the parties missed their chance to challenge the prudence of completing the nuclear plant. Id.
at 2441. The parties, however, may have been simply following FERC's previously announced
policy of declining to hear prudence testimony.
96. Id. at 2437-38.
97. Id. at 2445 (Brennan, J.,dissenting).
98. Id.
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the Grand Gulf project involved the purchase decision of a retail utility,
a state utility commission has jurisdiction to review the prudency of that
purchase. "99 Brennan said Nantahaladid not answer the question, as the
majority argued, because FERC did not order MP&L to participate in
building the plant: "[Tlhe question remains whether [MP&L] imprudently
incurred those costs in the first place. I am convinced that the state utility
commission does have jurisdiction over this prudency issue.""' °
To explain his decision, Brennan recounted FERC's jurisdictional history, concluding that the Court, not the agency, should decide FERC's
jurisdiction. 0' He cited his opinion in Arkansas Electric Cooperative and
the state court opinions in Pike County Light & Power and Appeal of
Sinclair Machine Products. He wrote, "In short, the reasonableness of
charging a rate as a wholesaler is distinct from the reasonableness of
incurring that charge as a purchaser."' 0 2 The peculiar attributes of interstate electricity pools, he said, added the complicating twist. The decision
to participate in a pool's building of a power plant (a decision at the
wholesale level) was simultaneously a decision to purchase power generated by the pool (a decision at the retail level). 03 Both FERC and state
utility commissions seem to have jurisdiction." °
Brennan said the Court should not defer to FERC's conclusion "that
it has exclusive jurisdiction to determine all prudency issues concerning
the participation of a retail utility in an interstate pool."'0 5 On this point,
Justice Scalia disagreed with Justice Brennan and argued in a concurring
opinion that FERC's jurisdiction should be accorded deference. "o6 Brennan said the Federal Power Act and its legislative history intended to
preserve states' authority. 07 He also noted that FERC, in the MP&L case,
originally took the position that it had no jurisdiction over the prudence
of a pool member's purchase decision; i.e., the prudence of MP&L's
decision to help build Grand Gulf."'0 Then it changed positions. He said
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 2448. The D.C. Court of Appeals, however, generally defers to FERC interpretations
of FERC orders. See Nelson, The Chevron Deference Rule and Judicial Review of FERC Orders,
9 ENERGY L.J. 59, 71 (1988), which states that Chevron compels deference to FERC even on "pure"
questions of law. See also Energy, 55 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 862 (1987) (examines D.C. Court of
Appeals decisions on energy, concluding that the court is deferential to agency determinations).
102. MississippiPower & Light, 108 S. Ct. at 2446 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 2444 (Scalia, J., concurring).
107. Id. at 2447 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 2448. "[The [Administrative Law Judge] stressed throughout the hearing the distinction between prudency issues relevant to setting wholesale rates and issues regarding the prudency
of power purchases and their effect on retail rates, and stated several times that he and FERC would
and could only address the former." Id. at 2448 n.*.
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that FERC's new position on jurisdiction "would divest states of authority
to determine the prudence of costs incured by retail utilities whenever
those utilities belong to an interstate pool-a result that I do not think
can be squared (particularly given FERC's shaky jurisdictional foundation) with the clear intent of Congress to preserve the authority of States
to regulate retail utilities."'09
Both the majority and Brennan saw the case as a jurisdictional struggle,
but only Brennan examined the consequences of the decision. The majority seemed content to tell the Mississippi state officials "You missed
your chance" through its observation that they attended the FERC hearing
but did not present the prudence issue, notwithstanding the fact that FERC
declined to hear the evidence. The case means that states, local industry,
and consumer groups must appear in front of FERC. They must travel
to Washington, D.C., even to argue that their own retail utility might be
making an imprudent decision by.joining a power pool or agreeing to
build a power plant. "oBrennan argued that this rather recent policy change
in FERC should not be allowed to usurp state jurisdiction, and that states
should continue to be able to review-at home-the retail utility's actions
and its pass-through of FERC-mandated rates.
CONCLUSION
This case cuts off the authority of state public utility commissions to
review the prudence of retail utilities incurring costs for "power that is
not needed at a price that is not prudent.""' In so doing, the case also
turns away a trend among states to question these types of decisions.
Once FERC approves the rate and the amount, they are settled, and the
utility may pass through the cost without question. This was accomplished
through an abrupt shift in FERC policy, a shift that the majority refused
to acknowledge in its quest to preserve plenary power in FERC.
ELIZABETH NEWLIN TAYLOR

109. Id.at 2449.

110. FERC "as a rule" holds its hearings on wholesale rates in Washington, according to Martha
Altamar, legal assistant to the chief administrative law judge of FERC. Telephone interview (Feb.
14, 1989). Rarely, she said, does FERC conduct field hearings away from Washington. The hearings
outside Washington are on applications to construct facilities, not who will be paying for them or
their future power allocations. She said the hearings are in Washington because that is where the
Commission is.
I 1. Mississippi ex rel. Pittman v. Mississippi Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 506 So. 2d 978, 985 (Miss.
1987), rev'd sub nom. Mississippi Power & Light, 108 S.Ct. 2428.

